

Utopian Visions: Emancipatory Possibilities

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Abstract utopians dream of far away El Dorado, the land of milk and honey, Oz, fairy tale kingdoms. . . (Kellner & O'Hara, 1976, p. 29)

I began to think, how do we systematically cultivate the ability to do what Bloch called *dreaming forward*, and what value does it have, to be compelled to imagine a different world? What are its characteristics? This is not the same as a political exercise in which we are always bound by someone else's profane choices, and we just select among them the least bad options. What do we want? Do we just want that when you go to the doctor, you don't have to pay? Is that it? Is that gonna do it? (Gilroy, in Shelby & Gilroy, 2008, p. 133)

The land of milk and honey, fairytale kingdoms and Oz. Who among us does not partake in utopian imaginaries? How can we not? We live in a time in which civil unrest inundates every corner of the world and is brought to our attention instantaneously through technology. Joblessness is at an all time high, social and economic inequalities have been made more immediate through the Occupy Movement,¹ current conflicts and wars cover our planet,² international competition dictates curriculum development, and accountability drives educational practices to such an extent that eruptions of widespread accounts of cheating on high-stakes

exams are no longer seen as unusual. It is almost impractical to consider what takes place outside our own homes and communities and worry of the wider world. Looking out for our own interests hardly seems uncharitable or even unethical; indeed, looking out for our own interests and protecting from others that which we do have feel democratic.

Such a condensed account of how bad off the world is serves to set the stage for a utopian narrative. At this point, through the use of rich, vivid, and robust descriptions, I could proceed with proffering my enticing conception of a better world, one that might include descriptions of meaningful work, plenty of leisure time, and perhaps even the abolishment of social inequities. This is a process that de Jouvenel (1965) referred to as “causing to see’ by means of a feigned description” (p. 438), and it is indeed an important step in the utopian process.

Utopia is a word that most of us do not take time to consider. It is a word that we use, more often than not, to describe something that we suspect will never come to be but that we nevertheless hold fast to; it is an image we embrace that gets us through the work week, that rewards us throughout our daily engagements; it is a place we go when so much feels unbearable; it is a goal toward which we work. The word *utopia* was brought into our common lexicon by Sir Thomas More (1516), and yet it is a model that dates back to (at the very least) Plato’s *Republic*. It is a word that is often cast as an aspersion, a condemnation and indictment (Bauman, 1976, p. 9), as a definition of a world that provides escape from our day-to-day circumstance, and as a tool for reconstruction. It is a word that literally means “no place,” and as such, it exists as a device, an abstraction, even a pedagogical strategy that provides multiple possibilities of thinking the world differently.

What is the purpose of considering utopian thinking, conceptions, models, practices, even the “will-to-utopia” (Mumford, 1922/1962, p. 11), in a text such as this? Utopia myths, as much as social contract myths, are surely just that, myths. Mumford reminded us, however, that even though utopia is generally thought of as a literary genre, ideas and myths are just as “solid” as anything real as long as we “continue to regulate [our] actions in terms of the idea, theory, or superstition” (p. 14). What ideas and myths, then, guide our actions and deserve such attention? What could be wrong with constructing a future based on rectifying what are seen as unfair and inequitable practices?

It is the goal and the purpose on which the utopia is based that merit attention. As such, in this chapter, I engage in what Gilroy (in Shelby & Gilroy, 2008) referred to as a “utopian exercise” in order to think through our³ “romance with” (p. 134) music as “part of the core curriculum” and as “balanced, comprehensive, and sequential” (National

Association for Music Education [NAfME], 2011b). I further build on Gilroy's suggestion that such a romance could be a representation of our "complicity with an unsustainable social and political order in the world" (p. 134). In this instance, Gilroy spoke of the racially oppressed, but his point that oppression could very well "bind [one] even more closely to a particular sense of the relationship between identity and property" is one that I will follow throughout this chapter. And although racial oppression certainly does not apply to the discipline of music education, a certain perception of our status within the public institution of schooling, as made manifest externally in scheduling and space and funding allocation, can foster goal-directed activities toward the protection of these limited resources, in effect rendering music educators broken and demoralized.

CHALLENGES OF "BETTERMENT"

A vision eutopian to one group may well be dystopian to another, not too novel a phenomenon for any student of social and political thought. Utopias, therefore, help to lay bare and make conspicuous the major divisions of interest within a society. . . . They portray the future as a set of competing projects, and thereby reveal the role of human volition and concerted effort in shaping and bringing it out. (Bauman, 1976, p. 15)

Traditional or classical utopias have many similar qualities to which I have already alluded. For the most part, they present, through the lens of the particular author or creator, a "better world" (p. 17) in which conditions such as freedom, happiness, and leisure are embedded into "a final or definitive social ideal" (Frye, 1965, p. 329). They are most often closed and delineated by strict borders, parameters, control, and punishments; as such, they are, for the most part, static worlds given that change would upset the proscribed and planned social order (Frye; Mumford, 1922/1962). They also tend to envision society as a whole—this may be a whole that continues to include slaves and euthanasia and that sanctions acts of war and aggression—but they usually take into account "the interaction of work, people and place, and to the interrelationship of functions and institutions and human purpose" (Mumford, p. 5). What could be problematic using utopian imaginary to guide one toward a better world?

It is not far-fetched to suggest that music educators have a utopian vision and blueprint: We see the world as one that doesn't include us and imagine a world that does. To that end, we are told to function and

operate as a cohesive unit because we are most “influential” when we seamlessly integrate ourselves “among state, division and national administrative structures and leadership teams” (NAfME, 2011b). Indeed, it could be said that we are embracing Marx’s critique of what he referred to as the utopian socialists: We are not relying on the moral compass of the larger citizenry to further our agenda; we seek “a much more tough-minded approach to the realization of social reform” (Fried & Sanders, 1992, p. 73). Tough-minded, yes, but ours is a very particular kind of “social reform” and not what Marx envisioned, which begs Gilroy’s question, What do we want? What is “gonna do it” for us? And is this gonna do it for everyone?

Mumford (1962) suggested that utopias function either as compensation or as conditions for release, and he labeled these as utopias of escape or reconstruction. The first “leaves the external world the way it is; the second seeks to change it” so that one might engage with the world on “one’s own terms” (p. 15). The first conception of utopia makes the world tolerable to us; in it, we build our fairytale and find our land of milk and honey, as it were. Although *utopia* is not a word that is commonly (if at all) used by music educators, it is a concept that nonetheless could be said to regulate our actions and behaviors. For instance, we manufacture utopias of escape when we refer to our classes as distractions from the expectations and responsibilities of general studies classes, when we attempt to “teach to” aesthetic responses predetermined by a particular repertoire named to be “high quality” by the test of time, when we rely on methods that equate functional literacy with the development of artistry, when we imagine the utopia of the performance and teach directly to the one-size-fits-all ineffability, and finally, when we imagine that becoming a permanent part of the curriculum will bring us the good life (Kateb, 1965).

As authors of our utopia, we see the world through our particular lens and then build on those elements we wish to “fully develop” (Frye, 1965, p. 232). In the United States, we do so not as individual authors, but as a discipline organized and framed by a governing institution—the National Association for Music Education—which has had the historical role of shaping and sanctioning those rituals that are “significant” and those that are not (p. 324). Significant, in this case, are music programs that have at the helm what is clearly delineated as a “professional”:

“We believe that a well trained music educator who meets the highest professional standards is critical to providing students with a comprehensive, balanced and sequential program of music. A professional is engaged and committed to rigorous teaching, dedication of time, advocacy, and service” (NAfME, 2011b).

A “well-trained music educator,” then, is someone who has essentially progressed through a “balanced, comprehensive and sequential” music program. This would seem to disqualify those whose musical experiences were based in differing musical cultures in which balanced, comprehensive, and sequential might very well take on a different look altogether. NAFME seeks, then, to change the external world with performative standards and policy statements, and every member must “individually and collectively [take] all practical and appropriate action steps to achieve the stated goals of the organization” (NAFME, 2011b). As such, we have become adept at wielding slogans about the utopian possibilities of music; indeed, advocacy is our modern-day manifesto, our rallying call of revolutionary purpose. Through the use of such characteristics as a rigid definition of “we” and “them,” allegiance to “NAFME as the primary association for ensuring the widespread advancement of the profession” (NAFME, 2011a), pronouncements of urgency in the moment, the use of “highly selective” historical evidence, and an unmediated style of rhetoric (Lyon, 1999, p. 2) designed to place critique as unhelpful, petty, and even unprofessional, our manifesto of utopian reconstruction names and demands loyalty and action. Moreover, to carry out our utopia of inclusion, we must prove to the world that music education is just as deserving, if not more deserving, of a place in the curriculum; we are hence compelled to demonstrate our exchange value in that we are both measurable and indescribable, and necessary for global (and thus capital) success. Our *telos*, or “goal-directedness, purposiveness” (Regelski, 2005, p. 4), must, in the words of Marx (1843/1978a), “represent [our] interest as the common interest of all the members of society” (p. 174).

Frye (1965) directed our attention to the “telos myth” as something that moves us “toward the actualizing of something better” (p. 336). Depending on one’s view of society, the telos myth differs. For instance, one essential parameter for Victor Turner (1982) and his notion of *communitas* is the way in which we come together and understand possibilities for deeper relationships through the interaction with others akin to ourselves. Music educators have seen this as positive, but we also continue to have tunnel vision in many ways. For instance, rather than seeing our interactions as joined and connected to broader educative goals (albeit those that are not linked to draconian assessment practices, scripted reading, and “guided instruction”), we see our world as the preservation of private interests that are formed at the discipline level. Disciplinarity, however, is a myopic way of looking at *communitas* and one that produces a very different telos than the *communitas* of Dolan (2001), which is “the articulation of a common future, one that’s more just and equitable, one in which we can all participate more equally, with more

chances to live fully and contribute to making of culture” (p. 455).

What, then, to make of a telos in which pursuit and preservation of private interests organize our principles and policies? From whence the foundation of our utopia of escape and reconstruction as the preservation of private interests? Thinking through our “relationship between identity and property” provides the space to move beyond the utopia of escape to “serious utopianism” (Bloch-Lainé, 1965, p. 424) and perhaps embrace freedom as the presence of will and not as the absence of parameters.

PRIVATE PROPERTY—NEGATIVE FREEDOM

There is never any shortage of horrible creatures who prey on human beings, snatch away their food, or devour whole populations; but examples of wise social planning are not so easy to find. (More, 1516/1965, p. 39)

[Nobles and gentlemen are] no longer content to lead lazy, comfortable lives, which do no good to society—they must actively do it harm, by enclosing all the land they can for pasture, and leaving none for cultivation. They’re even tearing down houses and demolishing whole towns—except, of course, for the churches, which they preserve for use as sheepfolds. (p. 25)

Utopia, in the words of Turner, has been “the victim of a critical tug of war” (as cited in More, 1516/1965, p. xi). Whether claimed by either “Catholics or communists” (p. xi), More’s *Utopia* has been interpreted as a blueprint, a cautionary tale, a [hoax] on the unintelligent, and fantasy (p. xii). Bauman (1976) believed that More used the word *utopia* to convey “intended ambiguity” (p. 10), and indeed More desired it to be “as entertaining as it is instructive” (as cited in More, 1965, p. xi).

Regardless of whether the book is an attack or an ideal, or even a blueprint for a “wise” society, it has, since its publication, provided a literary framework for the presentation of “an ideal or flawless state . . . permitting as much freedom and happiness for its inhabitants” (Frye, 1965, p. 329). Of course, it can never be said that music educators live lazy, comfortable lives, but it is instructive to think of those ways in which harm can be seen as preserving music programs through institutional and discipline policies in such a way that preservation of particular curricular goals and spaces is in contradiction to efforts toward *communitas*.

Throughout time, political theorists have taken up the justification of private property as a basic freedom. Both Locke (1690/1980) and Rousseau (1762/1997) considered the protection and preservation of

private interests and, subsequently, property by looking first at the family (pre-civil society). Neither of these men used the word *utopia*; indeed, both developed their thinking based on very particular constructions of the state of nature, but the protection of property as a basic freedom and right was integral to their conceptions of the need for and justification of a governing intermediary. If we take to heart NAFME's conception of effectiveness as one in which music educators "shall view NAFME as the primary association for ensuring the widespread advancement of the profession" (NAFME, 2011a), we can think of music education as a closed family or "miniature utopia" in which there is "a limited community of goods, a tendency to adjust one's actions to the welfare of the little whole, and a habit of banding together against the world at large" (Mumford, 1922/1962, p. 50). Certainly, closed institutions provide this type of miniature utopia, but Mumford also warned that this type of utopia "is the enemy—indeed the principal enemy—of the beloved community" (p. 50).

Beloved may not be the modifier chosen by NAFME to describe community, but they do speak of "uplifting the human spirit," which in this case refers to "fostering the well-being of society" (NAFME, 2011b). Framing music as a "basic need"—and this must be read as music education, rather than musicing or making music, because the argument can be made that people "music" outside the confines of formal schooling (NAFME, 2011a)—we desire to be emancipated from the curricular and policy constraints so that we might pursue the advancement of our self-interests. We believe, then, that this emancipation would "[permit] as much freedom and happiness for [us] as is possible to human life" (Frye, 1965, p. 329). Our conception of society is one in which the protection of property is central. This kind of negative freedom, however, based on the individual as an egoist, is one that is produced by the "bourgeois conception of the rights of man" (Nordahl, 1987, p. 776)—and as such, one in which no others can dictate what we do. Unfortunately, this freedom only secures, as Marx (1843/1978b) wrote, "the assurance of [our] egoism" (p. 43) "None of the supposed rights of man, therefore, go beyond the egoistic man, man as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice" (p. 43).

Private caprice are strong words, but our telos as "part of the core curriculum" is tied to a vision of society that furthers class distinction and compartmentalization; therefore, we should consider, as Nordahl (1987) does, that "freedom is not conceptualized as freedom from others"; rather, others are "viewed as enhancers of an individual's freedom, not as

barriers” (p. 777). Permanence in the curriculum is a worthy goal, but only if we see this process as one in which our telos is tied to the emancipation of all society.

At the time of this writing, Scott Schuler, NAFME president, wrote an article (2011) speaking to the “strengths and limitations” of large ensemble programs—a much-needed message from the president of this institution. However, before he laid out this vision, he began the article by differentiating and distinguishing music educators from “other teachers” (p. 8): “Music educators are, on average, even more wonderful than other teachers. I would love to be able to offer scientific evidence to prove this claim (beyond a lifetime of admiring observation) but, in lieu of research, proffer for your consideration three simple facts. . .” (p. 8).

Schuler’s three simple facts inform us that we know our subject better than others because we take more credits in our subject; we are more passionate about what we do (“How many math teachers go home and solve equations for recreation after school?”); and we have to compete for students and “*make* what [we] teach so compelling that busy students and lazy students alike both choose to enroll in class” (p. 8, emphasis added).

Schuler’s vision may indeed be more pluralistic and inclusive than what has traditionally been, however; positioning and “defining” who we are against others establishes, reifies, and legitimizes a formation of other and a negation of self. Griffin (1982) addressed this separation of self into an “I” and “you” and saw this kind of dialogue as the creation of a “denied self” that stands in “purposeful ignorance of the self” (p. 642). In other words, our construction of the “other teacher” says more about ourselves and this “fantasy of another’s being” (p. 643) than it furthers a goal of “uplifting the human spirit and fostering the well-being of society” (NAfME, 2011b).

COMMUNITY POSSIBILITIES

Behind [the aim of every utopian institution], however, is a vital idea: namely, that our attempts to live the good life are constantly perverted by our efforts to gain a living; and that by juggling gains and advantages, by striving after power and riches and distinction, we miss the opportunity to live as whole men. People become the nursemaids of their furniture, their property, their titles, their position; and so they lose the direct satisfaction that furniture or property would give. (Mumford, 1922/1962, p. 78)

One of the challenges of this chapter is to both honor and interrogate utopian thinking and the utopian project. The goals and values of

NAfME are not undesirable, or even “merely utopian,” and indeed should be seen as a “necessary condition of historical change” (Bauman, 1976, p. 13). But the picture is much more complex than this, and the idea that our utopian vision, based on arrival in the curriculum, is “gonna do it for us” is at the minimum simplistic.

Even as Marx thought through the relationship between private interests, bourgeois society, and the individual as slave (Nordahl, 1987, p. 761), he was not in favor of abolishing institutions as intermediaries. There would always be the need for “structures for policy-making and for the resolving of disagreements” (p. 764), but human emancipation would never be possible through a political intermediary (Marx, 1843/1978b, p. 32). Community, on the other hand, could provide the space for active responsibility to and within a larger collective, and progress toward human emancipation: “In a community people are not withdrawn almost entirely into their ‘private’ selves. They co-operate with one another for the achievement of common aims, not use one another as mere means to advance selfish ends. In a real community the people control the institutions, not the institutions the people” (Nordahl, p. 762). Cooperation is, by its definition, a reciprocal relationship, and a “real” community in the context of this chapter implies a community of educators across all disciplines. Music educators, however, are often their own worst enemy in terms of developing community. In the daily lives of music teachers, there is a schizophrenic relationship, or tension, between private and communal. It is one that is made manifest both internally and externally. We must fight daily against curricular requirements in which students may take only one extracurricular class. This means that the band, orchestra, and choir teachers will more than likely compete against each other for a handful of key musical students. We must also compete against each other for funding that must be allocated across entire music departments, and in states, such as Texas, where football/marching bands reign supreme, distribution is self-evident, and competition is simply subsumed under uncompromising oppression.

Externally, our lack of community building is marked by our interactions with local communities (how to build parent support for music programs), unions (how to protect time in the schedule), and professional development models (how to teach students to read music more efficiently and to run rehearsals with fewer interruptions). And although music teachers may genuinely feel isolated in their day-to-day lives, there is a paradoxical relationship between this isolation and the lack of interest they may feel in being more closely connected to generalists. It may be suggested, however, that neither generalists nor music educators have a sense of the other. For instance, music educators are simply one of the

“specials”; they provide “real” teachers with planning and release time, and students with a break in their day. Music consists of fun time, games, banging away at instruments, inscrutable scribbling on the board, and incessant performances that seem always to need rehearsal time. General educators cancel music classes with no previous warning, they pull students out of class without the approval of the music teacher, they spend the entire month of April teaching to the state tests, and the depth of their creativity is made manifest in the bulletin boards dedicated to the changing seasons. Superficial understandings? Absolutely and perhaps, but these serve as examples of those ways in which we are in essence divided from each other into an “exclusive sphere of activity” (Marx, 1843/1978a, p. 160) and how we use each other as mere means to advance ends.

On the other hand, there is no lack of thoughtful integrative models or new ways of thinking about curriculum development; indeed, this *NSSSE Yearbook* addresses many of the changes that are already in place. Even NAFME is challenging the idea of the “BOC, band, orchestra and choir” (Schuler, 2011, p. 9) as the only “avenues for music making” (p. 9). And models do exist that bring music educators into the local communities. The Mariachi Águilas program at University of North Texas, for example, is one such program, in which college students work with predominantly at-risk Hispanic youth. In this context, community engagement is “viewed as a process containing elements of shared benefit and reciprocity in which all parties learn from one another, realizing that music-making and all interaction are meaningful within specific social and cultural contexts” (Music as a Natural Resource Compendium, n.d.). Other university-based programs provide examples, such as the University of Iowa, where students and prisoners “work to bridge gaps in the justice system through music-making”; the University of Massachusetts Lowell SoundScape program, which is an “interdisciplinary, university based music intervention for high-functioning adolescents and young adults with autism spectrum disorders”; and the University of Limerick’s Nomad Project, a university access course designed to recognize and honor the deep “family and community commitments” of the Irish Traveler community (Music as a Natural Resource Compendium). And, of course, there are the after-school programs that provide musicianship classes, group lessons, and ensemble opportunities inspired by the work of José Abreu’s El Sistema, Venezuela’s revolutionary youth orchestra movement.⁴

Although these models do exist, it is important to recognize, however, how easy it is for people to see the surface of their representation rather than the core structure or philosophical aims behind the projects. As

such, these programs are often co-opted without attention to their original context and consequently are translated with inconsistency.

I believe there is a lesson to be learned about creating community from those who are thinking about improvisation, particularly those who are thinking through free improvisation. Most of us have a sense that to improvise is a technique we embrace when those “teachable moments” occur: The musical parameters or lesson goals remain the same, but we are willing to improvise in order to reach the planned objective. Free improvisation, on the other hand, is a process that breaks from the version of what was planned; rather it is, as Kanellopoulos (2007) believes, “a mode of thinking and acting that is not bound or constrained by particular stylistic confines of improvisational techniques” (p. 100). Kanellopoulos is, of course, speaking to musical events, but he sees these engagements as part of a conceptual process—indeed, an epistemology of knowing and doing that is not bound by a “scientific and technocratic model of education with delineated content, predefined skill acquisition, sequential instruction, [and] teacherproof procedures” (Hamblen, 1985, p. 42). Kanellopoulos wrote of the role that improvisation may have in advancing the “democratic imperative: practices committed to the pursuit of freedom, equity, and plurality” (p. 98), placing free improvisation much as one might consider generative curriculum. Hickey’s (2009) research supports these same imperatives; she reminded us that students come to schools as “improvisers and experimenters” (p. 298) and then followed this by asking how educators can “capture this proclivity and encourage and nurture the disposition . . . not as a product to be taught in a strict methodological or pedagogical manner, but as a process to be encouraged on the way to learning freedom and self-actualization” (p. 298).

Each of these authors is a music educator, and yet both are clearly concerned with the broader implications of musical actions and purposes within a larger educative framing. Rather than think of the musical ends and possibilities of improvisation, I build on both Hickey (2009) and Kanellopoulos (2007) to suggest that community (beginning at the micro-level of schools) could be built on curriculum designed specifically around improvisational experiences that lead toward moments that “shake [our] consciousness of [ourselves] in the world” (Dolan, 2001, p. 456). Through a common curricular and pedagogical frame, the protection of property that manifests through the division of labor would be lessened because curricular goals would center on understanding the “sociopolitical, cultural-historical conditions of one’s life, community, society, and word” (Gutstein, 2006, p. 4) rather than the “clarity of aims and objectives, approaches that view knowledge and skill acquisition as

linear and progressive processes” (Kanellopoulos, p. 98). Freedom would consist of the processes of self-actualization for everyone in the learning community rather than the absence of parameters that prevent each from pursuing egoist goals.

CONCLUSION

Eutopia – a place to be desired

A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias. (Oscar Wilde, 1891)

Perhaps this utopia vision seems more available for music educators who do not labor under draconian accountability measures as our generalist colleagues do. Although this may or may not be the case, and in many states, the measurement of music teachers is linked to the literacy scores of their students,⁵ considering free improvisation as a curricular and pedagogical goal presents its own specific challenges for all educators. Kanellopoulos (2007) spoke to these challenges through the issue of dialogue and generative curriculum. “For improvisation to become a flourishing practice and an edifying experience within [educational] settings, teachers need to resist glorification of the past, to be prepared to follow messy pathways of present-tense exploration, and to trust their students’ potentials to enter into improvised dialogues *from the very beginning*” (p. 100). The success of a serious utopian project is not merely a matter of resisting glorification of the past; one must also take into account the realities of the moment, and this must mean more than simply identifying the constraints of permanence. “It is [Bloch’s] conviction that only when we project our future in the light of what is, what has been, and what could be can we engage in the creative practice that will produce the world we all want and realize humanity’s deepest hopes and dreams” (Kellner & O’Hara, 1976, p. 16).

There is a relationship between utopia and ethics. As we make commitments to changing or addressing the realities of local populations and understanding the presentation of different constructions of knowledge, and even the ideological commitment of someone such as Abreu, there is great possibility for recovering one’s own ethics and the capacity to be utopian. However, all these models are constantly in danger of being usurped and simplified in an attempt to scale, advocate, and establish

ourselves. And yet we see utopia in place every day. People and programs such as the ones I cited understand that permanent status means very little, indeed nothing. It may mean security, but it does not mean real access or work toward equity or educational opportunity; it simply means delivery. Permanent status in the school curriculum is not our *deus ex machina*. It may mean progress, but it is progress within, as Marx (1843/1978b) would say, “the framework of the prevailing social order” and not the “final form of human emancipation” (p. 35).

Notes

1. The Occupy movement had its beginnings on September 17, 2011, in New York City. It subsequently became known as the Occupy Wall Street movement and spread (at the time of this writing) throughout the world to more than 80 countries. For more information, see the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* throughout the month of October 2011.
2. See <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html>. Mumford (1922/1962) wrote of war as “utopianism with a vengeance: the nihilistic perfection of nothingness” (p. 9).
3. Throughout this chapter, I reference the field and discipline of music education as one entity. I do so recognizing that all music educators are not the same and realizing that critics may suggest that I am engaging in what Barone (2003) has called “educational imaginary” (p. 202). However, this is not simply imaginary, but rather political theorizing based on (among other sources) the published agenda, goals, and mission statements of the governing institution, the National Association for Music Education.
4. For further information on El Sistema USA, visit <http://elsistemausa.org>.
5. In Miami-Dade, Florida, merit pay for all teachers (including music teachers) is linked to student test scores. See the September 30, 2011, *Miami Herald* (“Miami-Dade Schools Debut Merit Pay in Florida,” <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/09/30/2432013/miami-dade-schools-debut-merit.html#ixzz1ZRKMdMu7#storylink=cpy>).

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