CHAPTER SIXTEEN

"Reading" Methods

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Here is the reader who no longer has to read, who has everything under control. Furthermore, there is the reader who does not read either, but who awaits the arrival of the reading from some other place, as though everything that could be said, had been said, as though reading were over, and the text had said it all.

Wolfreys (2000, p. 10)

The concept and practice of reading is fairly straightforward. We read texts to comprehend, to obtain knowledge, for recreation, to recall, to replicate, and even to "broaden worldviews" (National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, Council of Chief State School Officers, 2010, p. 3). The same could be said about reading music. We rarely think twice about our relationship to and with the process of reading. We rarely consider what positions texts invite, assume, and even insist we take.

In 1968, Louis Althusser posed the question "What is it to read?" Although the wording of the question could imply a delineation of the procedural aspects of reading, Althusser is clearly interested in something beyond phonics versus whole language. He situates this question in the context of reading Marx's *Capital* and references the ways *Capital* has played out and continues to make itself known in our lives, not simply in our own reading of the text but also "by the writings and speeches of those who have read it for us" (Althusser & Balibar, p. 13). He then calls us to task recommending that we read *Capital* "to the letter," which means (among other intents) reading all four volumes of *Capital* in both the German and French translations. Althusser does indeed do this—however, not simply to present the text through his interpretation, but rather so that through his own multiple re-engagements with a text (whose ideas and concepts have perhaps become too

seemingly common sense) we as readers can find "new-born the experience *of* a reading" (p. 14) (italics added). For Althusser, this newly born experience is the catalyst that urges us to continue with a second reading, one that will nudge us further and deeper into contemplation and reflection. However, not so easy is this second reading; it is much more difficult to read in ways that call into question seemingly given and immutable ideas. Indeed, it is much easier for most to "await the arrival of the reading from some other place," as Wolfreys (2000) suggests in the opening quote.

As he continues to think through Marx's *Capital,* Althusser extends this idea of second reading and provides strategies of engaging anew with familiarity by contemplating how "reading" would shift if we were to pose different questions of the text. For instance, to read *Capital* as an economist would mean to read for the value of Marx's economic analysis and compare, without questioning, the economic models that already exist. To read as a historian would be to pose questions of Marx's historical analysis and its relation to a "historical object already defined outside" the text. To read the text as a philosopher, however, is to oppose readings that mine the text simply for its use value, treating the text, as Wolfreys (2000) writes, "as a commodity, parts of which can be used up, leaving only waste" (p. 5). Using the text for profit in a relationship that is "technical, mechanical even, exploitative" (p. 5) underscores for Althusser (1968) that there is no such thing as an innocent read. Consequently, because there is no innocent read, Althusser asks us to be guilty, to continually question our relationship to the object, and to take responsibility by asking questions that uncover innocence, and by asking ourselves, "What is it to read?" (p. 15).

WHAT IS IT TO READ METHODS?

To understand ideologies is to understand both the past and the present more deeply; and such understanding contributes to our liberation.

Eagleton (1976, p. viii)

I enter this conversation as one who has a complicated relationship with both Orff and Kodály.[1] It is a relationship that at first read may seem quite in-depth. I hold one master's degree with a Kodály emphasis and Level III Orff certification. I taught most of my 15 years of elementary music labeling my actions as either an Orff or a Kodály teacher and planned my excused absences around attending the respective conferences. As a "first read," my interests and foci appear obvious; perhaps there may even be a sense of my success as an elementary music teacher. However, one's first read can only be filtered through one's own "vested interests" (Ellsworth, 1996, p. 138), and this first read produces multiple interpretations of what my teaching may have looked like. One might imagine a picture of success, where children are reading music fluently, singing a cappella in three-part harmony, and playing

complicated arrangements on barred instruments. I never once concerned myself with whether what I was doing was a method or approach, nor did I concern myself with the social effects of this teaching. I *knew* children were at the heart of the process. What I was doing worked. But really what was at the heart of the process was the process.

When considering Orff and Kodály,[2] the designation of the term *method* or *approach* is dependent upon the context and the usage, both of which have shifted historically (and continue to shift). Revisiting two of the earliest publications in the United States that address Orff and Kodály, one is reminded that it is "method," rather than "approach," that governs their arrival. Mary Helen Richards describes "two methods books" sent to her personally from Kodály and references a series of charts she created in 1959 based on the development of his "music methods and materials" (Bennett, 1987, p. 27). In a 1969 article in which Denise Bacon outlines her studies abroad in both Orff and Kodály institutes, she refers to both Orff and Kodály as methods.

Beyond how they are designated, however, one central concept and idea of most any construction of music teaching is often framed by an understanding and following of sets of procedures. Thus, although in many cases teachers may interact with Orff and Kodály as approaches rather than as methods, it seems essential to understand that the structural procedures embedded in these approaches often come from repetition that adapts small changes, concepts, and aims based on the sets of procedures (see Chapters 2 and 4). What we see, then, is how these approaches are used to establish a language and grammar for how we organize our teaching. Consequently, methods (rather than approaches), defined by the social processes of school music, become the grammar of teaching.

Perhaps we hope for innocent engagements and thus rely on the grammar of methods to provide "objective" readings of contexts, students, repertoire, and musicking. However, authors such as Austin (1962) and Searle (1971) have addressed the ways in which speech acts (performatives) function and serve as actions that effect change simply in their uttering. Considering the power of words, then, we need consider how the "grammar" of music teaching might prevent us from looking anew at the ways methods invoke "successful" and immediate actions while at the same time rendering invisible hidden and embedded messages in that grammar. In "When Method Becomes Authority," Bennett (1986) considers this very issue with her concern over music teachers simply focusing on "the surface characteristics of an approach rather than the principles that guide its implementation" (p. 38). She concludes that this desire to simply take the activities back into the classroom is what turns the "approach into a method" (p. 38). In this chapter, I extend Bennett's thinking and recognize that although her admonishments may challenge us to think beyond the "surface characteristics," this particular read of methods remains innocent—it is still a search for exchange value. To read with guilt, or as a philosopher, would first necessitate reading the word *method* as a philosopher. Thus, in this chapter, I use "Methods" with a capital "M" to read them

as a complex system of signs. To be guilty of reading Methods, we must have a better understanding both of how the "principles that guide its implementation" came to be chosen among all others that could have been chosen and what it is that Methods does to us. Considering Methods as representation of something other than an approach to teaching means we might regard Orff and Kodály through a semiotic lens.

Troubling Methods

There would appear to be a certain anxiety concerning reading. This fear, produced in the face of the unreadable and the prospect of reading to-come, is related to an anxiety concerning identity. The acts of reading that call a halt to reading's motion are either explicitly or implicitly concerned with reading up to a point. That point is the constitution of the subject or the subject's identity, whether by identity we mean the individual reader or a reading community seeking to define itself.

Wolfreys (2004, p. 278)

Consider that those who identify themselves as Kodály or Orff "trained" or Kodály or Orff "teachers" (and even simply teachers who "use" Kodály or Orff activities) construct themselves in relation to these Methods as "other." It isn't that music teachers are written upon by Methods as passive agents, but, as Butler (1988) writes, "neither do embodied selves pre-exist the cultural conventions which essentially signify bodies" (p. 526). In other words, the social lives of music teachers are ones that are constituted by multiple practices in which these practices have "social, political, cognitive, moral and material consequences and effects" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 14). Thus, when we read music teaching as an Orff or Kodály teacher, we read without questioning the object (Methods). When we read music teaching as philosophers, we would contemplate Methods themselves and recognize the possible ways we are positioned by their "social, political, cognitive, moral and material consequences and effects" (p. 14). Fairclough believes "that it is vital to understand these consequences and effects if we are to raise moral and political questions about contemporary societies, and about the transformations of 'new capitalism' in particular" (p. 14).[3] And although it may seem odd to consider our engagements as ones that further an agenda of "new capitalism," reading Methods sheds light on innocent reads that do indeed mine for use value and exploitation and further individual rather than collective needs.

The field and discipline of semiotics understands anything to be regarded semiotically as a text, including "the world, a text, a curriculum" (Ellsworth, 1996, p. 38). Chandler (2002) refers to "'reading television' . . . films . . . radio programmes, advertising posters and so on as 'texts'" (p. 8). In the field of music education, Goble (1999, 2005, 2010) has applied Pierce's theory of signs to understanding musical social practices. To approach Methods semiotically, then, is to investigate

how they are represented and perceived, and to problematize the uses we make of them. It is to read them for meaning as a system of signs, not just as the written word, but in gestures, visual representations, workshops, conferences, and so forth to "become more aware of the mediating role of signs and of the roles played by ourselves and others in constructing social realities" (Chandler, 2002, pp. 10–11). To read Methods as text is to read them as ideological, products of historical discourses that have been entered and understood differently at various times. It is to read for unarticulated epistemological questions that underlie taken-for-granted assumptions as to what works, and for whom. It is to struggle to break free of structures that oppress both teacher/student and teaching/learning and to situate and challenge their historical conception as simple arrival and expansion. Indeed, a simple reporting of the arrival dates of Orff and Kodály into North America may be helpful in situating a timeline of development. However, to move beyond the celebratory and often mythical representation of these historical accounts, it is necessary to address the conflicting ideological discourses that were competing to construct curriculum development.

We cannot know history through any one account. Currie (1998) reminds us that "history and literature are discourses which construct rather than reflect, invent rather than discover, the past" (p. 88). When one narrativizes history, a "normal" structure of beginning, middle, and end is imposed. Thus, the history of music education (including the acceptance of Orff and Kodály as viable approaches) is already a narrativized account. Consequently, rather than relying on a historical presentation of events as value free, even innocent, we must consider how history has been presented so that it feels that these events, in the most common-sense way, not only speak for themselves but also already seem a given. To address from whence and why these Methods came, in reaction and out of what, and constituted by what came before, is to "begin with [a] social problem rather than a 'conventional research question'" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 209) that moves us beyond innocent reads toward one in which we mark our culpability.

To that end, this chapter posits that to read this particular world of music making, we need to better understand what positions Methods ask us to take by paraphrasing Ellsworth (1997) when we ask "Who do methods think we are?" It is to enter these Methods reading with different questions so as to trouble our practices. It is to "make possible and thinkable questions that I believe can set into motion ways of thinking and teaching that have otherwise become rigid, solidified, stuck, sloganized" (Ellsworth, 1997, p. 12). It is to read beyond so that we might recognize the multiple and complex meanings and contradictions in all that we do.

History

For a long time our profession has discussed the aims of education, but with no great results. Endless fervor has been expended in maintaining such radiant objectives as "culture," "social efficiency,"

"self-realization," "the harmonious development of the individual," "mental discipline," "character-building," and what not more of glorious vagueness.

Bobbitt (1921, p. 607)

The potency of a slogan is that it can create the illusion that an institution is responding to its constituency, whereas the needs and interest actually served are other than those publicly expressed. The slogan may suggest reform while actually conserving existing practices.

Popkewitz (1980, p. 304)

It is not within the scope of this chapter to trace the historical development of education in the United States. Even if that were possible, reading Methods means to uncover questions that are linked to particular ideologies that have influenced and shaped educational policies. As such, I think through the historical ethos and prevailing discourses influencing policy and reform prior to the arrival of Orff and Kodály in the United States. To do so, I trouble the concept of "child centered" engagements as the purview of progressive educators, consider Orff as an engagement that speaks to "radiant objectives," and situate Kodály as the epitomization of the scientific management systems of Taylor and Bobbitt.

Curriculum (and thus pedagogy and Method) has often been seen as a way in which to reconcile, control, and even solve the embedded tensions between the individual and society. The function of curriculum, then, can be seen as a tool to shape the ways in which students could and should be prepared to enter the world. Curriculum that has been produced by a technical model of rationality can be traced to the Enlightenment, a rationality that favors science, reasoning, logical and sequential structure, and phenomena that can be observed and measured. Other models have focused on character development, moral education, romantic naturalism, the unfolding of the child as a flower (Rousseau), utopian models (which under scrutiny are often governed by totalitarian methods—see Mumford, 1922/1962), education as social reconstruction (see Counts, 1932; Rugg, 1929/1936), and the reconciliation of school and society, in which schooling facilitates the "dispositions necessary for movement toward a changed social order" (Cremin, 1975, referencing Dewey, p. 1548). What we see in all of these models is not just competing rationalities, but rationalities whose discourse is governed by ideological perceptions of the function of schooling.

I suggest that these competing rationalities must not simply be distilled down into those that place the child at the center of the process versus those that do not. I am positing that the notion of "child at the center" is used and wielded by all forms of curriculum models including technical modes of rationality and progressive modes. I am positing that no matter the mode, the unquestioned discourse of placing the child at the center of the curriculum has served to hide networks of power relations and social control, thus preventing interrogation of curricular and pedagogical models that seem common sense. Recognizing that Bobbitt was both

channeling the work of Taylor (and the concept of methods of greater efficiency and top-down policymaking) and reacting against the current "progressive" beliefs in his time, we may react in horror to his words in the opening of this section. Even so, I am suggesting that one must read Bobbitt's sentiments as those that do indeed place the learner at the center of the educative process. It may be for reasons that "legitimate(s) the power of the ruling class in society" (Eagleton, 1976, p. 5), but the child is at the center. As we move through this chapter, I hope to make it clear that the phrase *child centered* has become "systematically ambiguous" (Popkewitz, 1980, p. 304) and functions too often than not as a slogan, one that surely demands a second read of both Orff and Kodály.

Considering: Scientific Management Is Still Child Centered

In 1911, Frederick Taylor recognized that the good intentions of the United States were inefficient. Taylor was referencing President Roosevelt's 1908 address to the Conference of Governors, in which he said:

> Finally, let us remember that the conservation of our natural resources, though the gravest problem of today, is yet but part of another and greater problem to which this Nation is not yet awake, but to which it will awake in time, and with which it must hereafter grapple if it is to live—the problem of national efficiency, the patriotic duty of insuring the safety and continuance of the Nation. (p. 12)

Roosevelt's words were geared toward both conservancy and the waste of our national resources. He was calling our patriotism to task in the form of inefficiency. Three years later, Taylor (1911) was frustrated by what he felt to be the larger issue, which was the general "awkward, inefficient, or ill-directed movements of men" (p. 5). For those who are familiar with Taylor's (1911) work in *The Principles of Scientific Management* and the ways in which this was embraced by the education community, there may be anger and frustration that these principles came to be adopted in such a way that they continue to inform curriculum development. In the late 1800s, after observing slow and what he thought to be deliberately lazy work, Taylor developed the concept of scientific management to "train" workers based on defined laws and principles. His model codified and delineated relations between management and workers in a way that necessitated top-down policy implementation and strict oversight by management to get more efficient work out of the worker. Although Taylorism is no longer in vogue, the themes of efficiency, regulation, training, and oversight can be seen throughout many fields, particularly in education, including time-on-task teaching/learning, top-down power relations, the deskilling of the teacher, and the creation of teacher-proof curriculum. Indeed, one of Taylor's goals was to "show that the fundamental principles of scientific management are applicable to all kinds

of human activities" (p. 7). But what many are probably unaware of is that at the heart of Taylor's work was what he believed to be the care of the worker, or "the maximum prosperity for the employee" (p. 9). In light of this, we certainly could say that Taylor was focused on human-centered engagements. Granted, this is troubling language and most definitely centered in "maximum prosperity for the employer"; however, it is not so different if one considers child-centered engagements that speak to efficiency of learning that are made manifest in the profit garnered from polished performances (free from mistakes) that yield "excellent" accolades from key stakeholders.

Economy in Teaching, Economy in Learning

The 1917 Committee on the Economy of Time was charged with writing a monograph focused on "Economy in Learning." This monograph took the form of the *Eighteenth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education.* The preface of this Yearbook reads:

> It was felt that the time is right for attempting to collect and make available the various published and unpublished investigations which throw light on economy in teaching the following subjects: Arithmetic, Reading, Writing, Composition, Spelling, Drawing and Music. (Seashore, 1917, p. 9)

It turns out that the author of the chapter dealing with economy of teaching music was Carl Seashore. Just as Taylor suggested in his classification of tasks for optimal efficiency, Seashore took it one step further and suggested (without considering the object) that classifying children in terms of aptitude would be the most efficient way of teaching music:

> The true solution, both in economy of time and efficiency of achievement, may be gained by carrying . . . three divisions, roughly as follows: the superior 25 per cent., the middle 50 per cent., and the inferior 25 per cent. . . ." (Seashore, 1917, p. 123)

Bobbitt (1921) was reacting against the current trend in "radiant objectives" (p. 607) by analyzing the precise activities one would need to perform and be prepared for. Clearly, this reaction was against different conceptions of what preparation for life entailed in the language of those who were writing curriculum and enacting pedagogy based in the current progressive philosophies of the day. Bobbitt was extending and applying what Taylor had done in systems of management. Seashore was reacting against what he felt to be practices in music education that disregarded data collected through experiments and research conducted in specific contexts. The classification of children was simply a solution to an efficiency problem.

Progressive Trends/Reconceptualizing the Educative Process

Child-centered curriculum and pedagogy have often been wielded as a rallying call of revolutionary purpose. Although not a manifesto as it stands alone, it has certainly been wielded as one within the discourse of multiple models of education. Through the use of such characteristics as a rigid definition of "we" and "them," the formation of the universal subject, pronouncements of urgency in the moment, the use of highly selective historical evidence that supports the need for reform, and an unmediated style of rhetoric that is designed to prevent interrogation or dissent, a manifesto names and demands allegiance (Lyon, 1999). This is much easier to see when we consider Bobbitt, Thorndike, Taylor, and others. It is much more difficult to see when the language is embedded in actions that purport to be innovative and creative and linked to the child's natural musicality. I am not suggesting that relationships should not be human centered—far from that. I am suggesting that historically, the formation of a language that was (and continues to be) established and legitimized becomes the nature of a *social contract* in the face of which alternatives are restricted. What becomes clear as we read Methods is how "child centered" is not only embedded in rhetoric of creativity, participation, social skills, and social justice (terms linked to communal and public actions) but also unabashedly found within models that are linked to efficiency and global market–placed accountability—unmistakably used to argue economic benefits.

Consider briefly the ways in which conceptions and uses of music curriculum swayed with ideological winds (and in many cases contradicted conceptions from the same time period) in the years leading up to the arrival of Orff and Kodály in the US educational system. In 1939, Flueckiger condemned music curriculum that "exposes" children to music but that does not teach how to read music. He raises the point that some may feel this may be stifling the interest of students, which he quickly rejects by saying that by learning how to read, "*we* cover twice as much music in a year as without such study—with ever-increasing pleasure" (p. 18, italics added). In the tried-and-true pedagogical strategy of bait and switch, he believes that it is the job of the music teacher to "stimulate" children so that the "tool" of reading music is used to further "vocal music; instrumental music; and, third, as an important ingredient in music appreciation" (p. 18). Flueckiger even manages to use the "P" word in a clever turn of language that manages to reference progressive tenets while at the same time dismissing them:

> Those who spell their progressive education with a capital "P" will be ready by now to brand the writer as a hopeless reactionary. But to them he should like to say that he, too, believes in the basic principles of progressive education. These principles are, however, recognized as not really new in theory, but chiefly in the increased emphasis they have enjoyed in recent years. Perhaps Saint Paul's injunction to the Thessalonians to "prove all things; hold fast that which is good," which may be freely paraphrased as the point

> of view expressed by the scientific attitude, may be considered as one of the important trends in music education today. (pp. 18–19)

Clearly, these are representations of the shifting of ideological winds in which what was once valued becomes immediately suspect as language is repositioned, even co-opted and repackaged depending on the use and need of the educator. The purported needs of the child/student, however, remain consistent. Smith (1944), on the other hand, writing in the midst of World War II, challenged the "we" of Flueckiger and referred directly to exploitation embedded in the positioning of music curricula.

> In short, when music teachers and directors think less of their own glorification and what they can do with music through the exploitation of young people, and think more of what music *can do to* young people, they will find emerging the finest singing and playing groups they ever had. (p. 16, italics added)

His questioning underscores both Ellsworth's (1997) reminder that the mode of address between teacher and students as something that "can do to" is often invisible. It also helps to illuminate Althusser's exhortation that we must read to question the object itself so that we may "in turn . . . be dragged in the wake of this first reading into a second one which will take us still further" (Althusser & Balibar, 1968, p. 14). However, from that same time period, Boyle (1943) contemplated the challenges music educators would face with the return of American soldiers from World War II by taking the opportunity to link the nationalistic framing of "*teaching* the child to be a *free* human being" (italics added) by developing "inner discipline through the performance of great music" (p. 16). More obvious child-centered language is invoked as both rationale and "basic working philosophy" as we move forward and out of the war years into a technologically expanding world when Martin wrote in the 1947 issue of *Music Educators Journal*:

> First, the emphasis in our teaching is placed on the child, and the thing that matters most is what happens to him rather than what happens to music. We must regard music-making not as an end in itself but as a powerful agency for making a difference in the way children think and feel and act. (p. 52)

Martin's conception of the child as an agent in society is based on "modern educational concepts" (p. 52), which moves us closer to goals that are connected to social reconstruction. On the other hand, one could say that Boyle's radically different views are also based on modern educational concepts. However, Martin is not interested in the finished product as a performance of great music, but rather "terms of music's contribution to the development of each individual child" (p. 53). Martin might not think of her words this way, but such a conception of agency would ring true with Eagleton's (1976) concern that exhibitions and performances

such as those that Boyle champions present a "dramatic illusion [as] a seamless whole which conceals the fact that it is constructed . . . [which in essence prevents] an audience from reflecting critically on both the mode of representation and the actions represented" (p. 64). Such a dramatic illusion might also ring true for those who have seen the stirring demonstrations of both Kodály and Orff presented as "superlative demonstration(s)" (Bacon, 1969, p. 55).

Fast forward to more current "modern educational concepts" and consider finally the Partnership for 21st Century Skills and its "*holistic* view of 21st century teaching and learning" (italics added):

> The Partnership for 21st Century Skills is a national organization that advocates for 21st century readiness for every student. As the United States continues to compete in a global economy that demands innovation, P21 and its members provide tools and resources to help the U.S. education system keep up by fusing the 3Rs and 4Cs (Critical thinking and problem solving, Communication, Collaboration, and Creativity and innovation). (Partnership for 21st Century Skills, n.d.)

The stealthlike use of the word *holistic* feels so normal, so right that we think nothing of its use in this context, yet this word, which is intimately tied to child-centered strategies such as constructivist learning, reflective practices, identity, democracy, and the whole child, is in this case connected to furthering global competition and a way to legitimatize the neoliberal view. Lyon (1999) writes, "The syntax of a manifesto is so narrowly controlled by exhortation, its style so insistently unmediated, that it appears to say only what it means, and to mean only what it says" (p. 9). Child-centered, student-centered, and even learner-centered engagements may seem to shift the focus from the teacher to the student, but perhaps in such a sleight of hand that the "meaning [that] gets produced, circulated, negotiated, and interpreted" (Ellsworth, 1997, p. 10) remains covered and hidden. Child-centered language is beyond reproach, so seemingly natural that it approaches the status of myth, appearing "a-political and a-historical" (Palermo, 2000 p. 192). Far from indicating sets of neutral engagements, the totalizing rhetorical persuasion of child-centered rhetoric supersedes and perhaps deters efforts toward autonomy of musicking that are not sanctioned by the "official" in all of its multiple representations.

Historical Conditions

In 1935, Marion Flagg posed the following questions:

> What is being done to achieve a balance between the social aims of music and the need for developing power in music as an art? The balance, for instance, between the program where music is carried on independent of the rest of the school program, and the

> program that refuses to recognize the validity of any experience unless it grows out of the social experience? (p. 31)

The historical conditions that make possible both the arrival and widescale acceptance of these Methods span space and time. The questions Flagg posed (indeed, the entire article) speak to the tensions between child development, the social aims of education, and "effectiveness." Moreover, these are the same kinds of questions that underlie the tensions mirrored in the broader, mid-1930s world of curriculum theory. Of particular interest in this chapter is the turn in language that indicates tensions between child-centered engagements and measurable skills/efficiency, free action of the individual/social Darwinism, and democracy/education. As we will see, the arrival of both Orff and Kodály triggered reactions and spoke to many in ways that indicate similar complexity in purpose and aims. These turns may seem obvious if we consider education simply in vague terms such as *progressive* and *traditional*, or even *extramusical, aesthetic*, and *informal/formal*. However, historical conditions are never obvious and the lens through which one chooses to read discourse has everything to do with "reading" texts.

Philosophical Influences

> *Pestalozzi's search for a science of education, where he invoked the spirit of empiricism and rationalism, inspired disciples on both sides of the Atlantic to create variations on a formal method—object teaching—that proved as rigid as any other pedagogical system.*
>
> Reese (2001, p. 13)

Both Rousseau (1712–1778) and Pestalozzi (1746–1827) are often cited as major influences in the literature that surrounds and supports Orff and Kodály. Rousseau believed that one needed to encourage and scaffold experiences based on sensory impressions and intuitive ideas that can be broken down into manageable pieces. Pestalozzi (1894), whose own writings were influenced by those of Rousseau, articulated the laws of teaching. Among those stated laws was the imperative to arrange objects together through their similarities, and in ways that would allow one to take them in through different senses. It is fairly easy to see the connections that can be made to both Orff and Kodály. In particular, the concept of sound before symbol, experience before naming, and distilling the whole into manageable parts can be traced to the writings of both Rousseau and Pestalozzi. These engagements aren't simply ways of teaching. For these two philosophers, these processes reflected a child-centered focus. However, what may not be referenced when linking Rousseau and Pestalozzi to Methods is that these child-centered engagements were grounded in educating the lives of middle-class, bourgeois children. Moreover, "poor" children were better served by "moral education and social control" (Reese, 2001,

p. 14) rather than ideals shaped by the ruling class social system. Returning to these philosophers' conception of child-centered learning, then, serves to ground Methods in a broader context and moves us away from attributing to these ideas an "independent existence . . . without bother[ing] ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 173).

Recall that Bobbitt was particularly frustrated by the "cloudlike" language of "glorious vagueness" that spoke of objectives as "radiant" (1921, p. 607), a perhaps not-so-subtle reference to Dewey and others of the time. Recall also the ways Bobbitt used the ideas of Taylor to delineate a systematic procedure that would move curriculum from the language of "cloudlike" to definite objectives. Bobbitt believed that the school should provide experiences and activities that were needed for advancement, stability, and consistency in life. These activities (much like the factory assembly line upon which his work was based and the scientific management movement) were broken down from the complex into discrete subskills. To define and select those activities, one needed to both consult a specialist/vocationalist and move into the world and observe the skills, abilities, and habits of those working in the field. Once these habits were identified, one could then divide these into subsets and units so that they could be taught and learned. For those frustrated by a lack of mastery of content or discipline, Bobbitt offered vision that provided structure, discipline, and scientific management.

Although Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Bobbitt are separated by time and space, they situate discourse that constructed the ideas, values, and feelings that made possible an incomparable impact on elementary music teaching. Attending to parallel engagements and discussions in the field of elementary teaching also means addressing the ideological context that welcomed initial reactions to Orff and Kodály.

Movement to the United States

The arrival and acceptance of both in the United States was made possible by visits from a variety of music educators to Salzburg and Hungary. Hughes (1993) helps us to reflect upon the widespread interest in Orff and its effect on North America. Her interest in assessing how the original Orff and Gunild Keetman scores, *Music für Kinder*, were translated and adapted into English furthers an understanding of how texts, both aural and written, come to be codified and eventually sanctioned. She points out that five volumes of *Music für Kinder* essentially presented the teaching sequence Orff and Keetman had developed in Germany. At this point there were no training manuals or step-by-step progressions. "[Orff] trusted the teacher to build musical skills and to integrate them with language development in an appropriate way" (p. 74). Consequently, Doreen Hall worked with Orff and Keetman on the English translation *Music for Children*. Hall had graduated from the Royal Conservatory of Music and was the one chosen to adapt the music and

materials in *Music für Kinder* to American folk songs (Hughes, 1993, p. 77). When it was discovered that there were no suitable materials that would parallel the similar music sequencing found in *Music für Kinder*, Hall simply wrote pentatonic songs to Mother Goose poems.[4]

Hughes (1993) also includes quotes from charter members of the American Orff-Schulwerk Association (AOSA) that speak of Schulwerk as providing movement opportunities and stimuli for improvisation. However, the quotes from others Hughes chooses to highlight in her text sound quite like the "radiant objectives" Bobbitt (1921, p. 607) challenged: "new life for the child by the positive attitudes it stimulates" (citing Grace Nash), "allows children the opportunity to develop their own capabilities according to their potential whenever the teacher provides guidance in a non-didactic way" (citing Herbert Zipper), and "builds on natural musicality, enables children to make connections with their own deepest emotions and feelings" (citing Isabel Carley; Hughes, 1993, p. 87). All of these quotes speak to the Rousseau-like intentions of Orff, who wrote of Schulwerk as a "wild flower": "It is an experience of long standing that wild flowers always prosper, where carefully planned, cultivated plants often produce disappointing results" (Orff, as cited in Fuller, 2005, p. 52).

Marion Flagg's 1966 contribution in *Music Educators Journal* "evolved from a visit to the Orff school in Salzburg; from attendance at demonstrations at the 1958 meeting in Copenhagen of the International Society for Music Education; from a study of the content; use of the recording, and use of the Orff instruments" (p. 30). Her interrogation of Orff stems from many perspectives, but what is most interesting is a critique that manages to call into question multiple discourses. Among the issues she raises are the step-by-step procedures that stem from the notion that students are sonic and experiential blank slates:

> The child, for whose musical growth education is responsible, does not come to instruction as a blank page to be written in step by tiny step through any historical reenactment. He comes to the beginning of his instruction having lived all his life with music of all kinds from any period, to which he has responded naturally if not consciously. (Flagg, 1966, p. 30)

Flagg also speaks of the way patterns (in the Method) need to be "set" that belie the purported "organismic" nature of development of humans. She finds the "reenactment" of the history of tonality and rhythms particularly problematic as she likens this to the failed biological "recapitulation-of-the-race theory of learning" (p. 30). She manages also to speak to a theory of teaching that frames experience much as Dewey might: "A musical experience, if truly an experience, leading to changed behaviour, is a unity, an entity" (p. 30). In essence, and in a turn of language that suggests an informed reading audience, she believes that Orff is asking us to "'separate out' from the 'messages' received those which have meaning and usefulness for [the child] at his stage of growth and development" (p. 30). I spend time with

Flagg's relatively brief examination of Orff not only because she is among the first to address Orff in print but also because her questions—and inherent tensions—so powerfully framed this early on are in a few instances echoed by some but also unheard and even dismissed by so many others.

Flagg may have been one of the first to write about Orff, but others were also traveling during the mid- to late 1950s to view Orff demonstrations at the International Society of Music Education Conference (ISME), the National Music Educators National Conference (MENC, now National Association for Music Education [NAfME]), conferences and sessions in Toronto (connected to the Royal Conservatory of Music), and initial after-school and in-school forays on the East and West Coast. The arrival of Kodály came later in the 1960s and, as Choksy (1969) phrases it, "caught the fancy of American music educators" (p. 57) with the 1964 Mary Helen Richards American adaptation, *Threshold to Music*. Richards's initial interest in Kodály emerged out of a general concern that arts programs would be cut in favor of science and mathematics programs because of the Russian launching of Sputnik (Bennett, 1987). This focus on science and mathematics certainly came out of a curriculum field that was perceived to have not been skills based enough to place the United States at the forefront of the space race, and clearly arts educators were concerned about the impact this might have on their own programs (Bennett, 1987; Tacka & Houlahan, 1990). On the other hand, this focused attention on the "concerns with the nation's supply of knowledgeable human capital" that required "sufficient emphasis on standards and the traditional academic disciplines" (Johanningmeier, 2010, p. 350) did not imply, as it came to be operationalized, back to measureable basics. Rather, physicists and mathematicians called for meaningful "emphasis on basic ideas and less emphasis on practical applications" (p. 351). So while science and mathematics became a focal point for curricular focus, the original intent was to present these disciplines as wholes, rather than systematic procedures and intuitive ideas that could be broken down into manageable pieces.

Denise Bacon and Lois Choksy also provide insight into the early conversations held in *Music Educators Journal*. They are particularly interesting for this chapter as both echo Flagg's concerns in many ways and highlight the tensions between experience and literacy. Choksy (1969) was frustrated by the disconnect between a U.S. ethos of celebrating differences in children (one perhaps more romantic than operationalized) and "[justifying such a] structured an approach in music—one that not only does not encourage differences, but does not admit that such differences exist" (p. 59). Bacon (1969) identifies the problematics of the seductive qualities of Orff and calls to mind Bourdieu's (1998) point that power is often made manifest in charisma:

> [Orff] is a concept so broad, so fascinating, and the sound of the instruments themselves so alluring, that it is susceptible to the worst kind of gimmickry on the part of either unscrupulous or untrained teachers. It is far too easy for a clever teacher or supervisor to "sell" the Orff for whatever purposes he sees fit by a superlative demonstration

> for school officials, the P.T.A. and so on. The audience may be enchanted, but in nine cases out of ten, no real learning may have taken place. It is too easy to allow the child who has trouble with rhythm to play the triangle "for color" whenever he feels like striking it so that he will not need to feel beat, or to let the child who cannot sing, play the gong to begin or end the piece so that he will not ruin it. (Bacon, 1969, p. 55)

I quote Bacon at length to underscore how her reflections seem to have been lost since her words were written. Words such as *alluring*, *gimmickry, selling*, and indeed, *exploitation of the student* indicate what Althusser would call an innocent read. This innocence is also exposed in a 2005 interview with Katinka Daniel (Fuller, 2005). Daniel came to the United States in 1960 with the help of Dag Hammarskjöld and arrived in Santa Barbara, where her husband was a professor at the University of California. She met Robert Trotter at a concert lecture in which Kodály's *Peacock Variations* were being performed. This initial contact with Trotter ended with an invitation for Daniel to give a lecture on Kodály at UCLA. At this lecture, she ended by two-hand signing a two-part Bach chorale.

> I told one side to sing with my right hand and the other to sing from my left hand. We sang the Bach chorale in solfége in two parts. They had never seen anything like it. And I got a standing ovation. (Fuller, 2005, p. 193)

One can imagine the audience's wonder and amazement by this show of deft musicianship. There must have been reactions that certainly went beyond alluring. Here was "musicianship" and literacy at its best. If communist Hungarian children could do such a thing, surely the free-citizen children in the United States should and must learn to do the same!

Bacon (1969) echoes this sentiment when she points out that the Orff Institute in Salzburg focused more heavily on movement, "imagination and creativity" (p. 54) and that Kodály must be "studied thoroughly and sequentially" (p. 53). Bacon sums this up by posing the question that speaks to the heart of the contradictions embedded in the ideological positioning: "Does the Orff really lead to musical literacy? Is musical literacy really a desired goal for every child?" (p. 55).

Although her critique of Orff seems to be a music literacy issue (note reading and writing), her largest critique of Kodály is rather the "problem of literature" and not at all the sequential structuring in manageable steps, which she sees as "disciplined" (p. 55). Thus, Bacon (1969) concludes that both may be needed in the curriculum as

> the Kodály . . . leads to musical literacy and has proved successful with a whole nation; the Orff because it holds out the hope that each child may become a freer individual, better able to express himself and to relate to the world in which he has to live. The Kodály is disciplined, sequential, and truly musical; the Orff is free, not stereotyped and creative. I think our children need both discipline and creativity. (p. 56)

Far from a guilty read, Bacon takes the path of least resistance and embraces both. Symbolizing and epitomizing a nation of music teachers who "no longer [have] to read, who [have] everything under control," she embodies the elementary music teacher "who awaits the arrival of the reading from some other place, as though everything that could be said, had been said, as though reading were over, and the text had said it all" (Wolfreys, 2000, p. 10).

Lingering Thoughts

Has our emphasis on teaching a strict sequence of tonal intervals to children had the effect of changing our national heritage of folksongs? Have we limited children's singing to (overly) simple songs that are school music, but not necessarily home music? Have we shifted (as Charles Elliott asked) from singing for pleasure to singing for pedagogical purposes?

P. Bennett (personal communication, May 29, 2013)

Recall that Althusser reminds us that there are no innocent readings. Indeed, the readings that mine for the use value of texts are not just guilty of exploitation. These kinds of readings that appear innocent serve to reproduce "normal" engagements cloaked in language that seems beyond reproach or interrogation. How easy it is for us to blame Bobbitt, Taylor, Thorndike, and the myriad accountability systems they may have influenced. It is not so easy, however, to recognize how we are positioned by Methods. The social effects of our choices should guide our pedagogical and curricular goals. If our actions and choices mirror business models and scientific systems, "protect both a capitalist industrial economy and individual upward mobility" (Palermo, 2000, p. 199), produce passive consumers (producers rather than creators), and perpetuate a sorting model of education, one might think we would be horrified. And even though there may be an acknowledgment that we are living in a postmodern time of multiple narratives, not recognizing our pursuit of the binary positioning and rhetoric of narratives—such as the triumph of pedagogy and curriculum that positions the child at the center—continues to reproduce larger structural and privileged discourses that dictate, among others, social effects that go untroubled.

Based on the singing schools of the 19th century, in which the goal was to "improve singing in the church service" (Birge, 1928, p. 88), systems of note reading emerged and evolved. To that end, the use value of elementary curriculum was to perpetuate a dominant discourse based in the religion of the ruling class. Jump to the 1930s and we see the emergence of competition narratives all with the child's best interests in mind. Reese (2001) addresses the ways in which the writing of philosophers such as Rousseau and in particular Pestalozzi "allowed child-centered educators and activists on opposite sides of a question to claim him as their authority" (p. 13). From "vocational education for the masses[,] . . . manual

labor," (p. 13) and education for life to natural flowering, literacy, allowing for difference, and teaching to what children should "know and be able to do," teasing out ideology calls for being dragged into a second reading that "will take us still further" (Althusser, 1968, p. 14).

In our own discipline, we have been called to second readings. In 1939, Flagg cautioned us to realize that our actions cannot be solved by seemingly simplistic engagements because the world is "complex, disturbing, and terribly exciting" (p. 30); in 1987, Bennett called into question method as authority by suggesting that "the techniques [collections of devices] themselves are authoring the method" (p. 39). Regelski (2005) invoked the concept of "methodolatry" and indicted "music educators' propensity for accepting methods as curriculum models" (p. 13) and engagements with them as "coming close to the worship of religious idols" (p. 13). And I considered how "these methods have become more real than the music itself and as such, music making is abstracted and consequently exchanged as a commodity" (Bennett, 2009, p. 213). In the valuing of Methods, what have we lost? Or, to paraphrase Hoffer (1951), is faith in Methods a substitute for the "lost faith in ourselves" (p. 14)? In what ways does the overvalorization of Methods deny the "social, political, cognitive, moral and material consequences and effects" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 14) of the processes of school musicking? The challenge is to be open to readings that do not "bring with [them] a program or method" (Wolfreys, 2004, p. 276). Our challenge is to be open to readings that welcome new modes of production that call us to realize our human capacities; it is to be willing to read with guilt.

NOTES

1. I have addressed this relationship in other places (see, for instance, Benedict, 2009).
2. In this chapter, I focus solely on Orff and Kodály because of their predominance in public elementary music curriculum. However, one could draw similar connections between the issues raised in this chapter and Suzuki's (1983) concept of character development connected to "correct methods [of] training" (p. 1). Dalcroze (1921), on the other hand, presents an entirely different set of issues when one confronts his use of music to "subdue the activities of too excitable temperaments" (p. 8). And although he believed that people of European descent have greater muscular capacity than those people of "savage races" (p. 320), one need not worry, for subduing temperament can "easily be modified by training" (p. 321).
3. In this context, new capitalism refers to the ways in which capitalism and capitalistic engagements, under the influence of a neoliberal agenda, have influenced and can influence educational practices in which the language we use and our pedagogical actions reproduce hyper self-individualism that defines freedom in terms of (for instance) competition, serving to move us away from systems of democratic practices that support a holistic community.
4. Peggy Bennett remarks on the problematics and influence of Hall simply making up pentatonic music as repertoire: "It may well be that, after four decades of emphasis on

teaching intervals, we now have generations of children and teachers who no longer know our national heritage of folksongs. Prior to the 1970s, only a handful of songs consisting solely of the So-Mi or So-Mi-La intervals existed in American song collections. With the intent to teach intervals of So-Mi, So-Mi-La, and So-Mi-Do, pedagogues began placing these intervals on familiar and created poems and sayings. Over time, these created songs were repeated and published as 'folksongs,' even though they were more accurately 'folk sayings,' sung on select intervals" (Peggy Bennett, personal communication, May 30, 2013, and 2013 Mountain Lake Conference).

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